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論説
Archival Documents About the France-Indochina-Japan 
Relationship during World War II (The Case of the 
Haiphong-Yunnan Railway)
CAM ANH TUẤN
The failure of the French bourgeoisie’s efforts to penetrate the Chinese 
market at the end of the 19th century coupled with the fall of Napoleon III 
forced the French to review their position in the Far East and find a way to 
realize their Chinese dream. Tonkin, which is located in northern Vietnam, 
boasts plentiful rivers whose sources lie on China’s southwest plateau. 
Tonkin’s rivers flow through Chinese territory to the South China Sea, and this 
geographical factor played a part in the conceptualization of French Indochina, 
specifically the French Empire’s desire to link Haiphong, Vietnam to Yunnan, 
China via railway. This ambitious initiative was undertaken by Paul Doumer 
who promoted the project as a means of developing the economy of France’s 
overseas territories or the so-called “balcony on the Pacific.” The railway was 
opened to the public in 1910.
Thirty years after the railway’s inauguration day, during the World War 
II era, the Haiphong-Yunnan railway in particular, and Indochina in general, 
combined to unintentionally become one of the objective causes as well as 
an historical object of disagreement between Paris and Tokyo, both of whom 
were plagued by suspicions at the time. The railway played an intermediary 
role in the complex relationship that existed between the two most powerful 
influences in Indochina, and their treatment of the railway reflected, in part, 
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their diplomatic policies.
1. An overview of the historical context of the Haiphong-Yunnan railway
Considered an El Dorado of the world, China, as a great Eastern power, has, 
since Marco Polo, always attracted great fascination from the countries of the 
West.
In Westerners’ eyes, China was the land of “the myth of inexhaustible 
wealth.”
Nevertheless, China did not become the target of Western and Japanese 
colonial expansion policy until the mid-19th century. There are two main reasons 
for this late reaction. The first is China’s policy. For a long time, the Chinese 
court has persisted with a closed-door policy that bars Western traders and 
missionaries  from setting up operations in China. For traders, this policy made 
it too difficult to trade with what “is a world in itself, which can be sufficient 
without resorting to products from abroad.”1) Chinese doors were also closed to 
missionaries, who could have expressed similar sentiments as traders given that 
China possesses a very rich and varied civilization as well as a Confucianism-
dominated society. It took 5 centuries for these groups to set foot in China 
after first contact was established by Marco Polo in the 13th century; however, 
in 1776, the first consulate was opened in Canton. The second reason for 
delayed entry into China cited “difficulties of establishment in . . . [a] country 
too vast and too distant, [and] little appreciated by . . . diplomats at first.”2) In 
spite of these barriers, the Chinese dream still existed in the minds of all those 
who “engage[d] in the colonial adventure to evangelize, conquer, trade and 
prospect.”3) Given its wealth, China was an attractive but not easily attainable 
goal.
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Having implemented various strategies to realize their Chinese dreams, the 
French finally managed to stand out from the other Western powers by finding 
their own, very competitive route to the Far East:  going through Tonkin in 
order to access south China and reach the prized region of Yunnan.
The construction and operation of the Haiphong-Yunnan railway line took 
place as part of the French conquest of Vietnam, which began on September 
1st, 1858 with an attack on the port of Tourane (Đà Nẵng) (a city at the center 
of Vietnam) and concluded in 1945 after the Japanese coup and Vietnamese 
independence. In 1898, after France solidly established itself throughout the 
whole of Indochina, Paul Doumer took office as the Indochinese governor 
general and immediately launched an ambitious plan to build an Indochinese 
railway network. Among the eight railways that were submitted to the High 
Council of Indochina, the line connecting Tonkin to Yunnan (Hải Phòng-Lào 
Cai-Yunnan) was selected as first priority. Its construction spanned 1898 to 
1910. In 1945, as a result of the Japanese coup and Vietnamese independence, 
France lost all its ownership rights to the railroad.
The railway played an important role in France’s strategy regarding 
Indochina and China. Not only did it mark France’s presence in southern China, 
it also served as “a guarantee of security for the French colony”4) in Indochina. 
During World War II, Chinese nationalist troops in west China depended on the 
railway for supplies in their fight against the Japanese. As a result, the railway 
line became an important link in the context of French-Indochina-Japanese 
relations during World War II. However, Chinese nationalist troops were forced 
to dismantle a portion of the railway as part of their efforts to prevent Japan 
from invading Yunnan. 
The beginning of the Sino-Japanese War was marked by the battle of Marco 
Polo Bridge on July 7th, 1937. From a political and diplomatic point of view, 
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the French government observed that “The state of war between China and 
Japan had never [been] officially declared,”5) so France declared itself neutral 
in the conflict by limiting the transit of war material despite strong reproaches 
from both the Japanese and the Chinese. Until 1939, the Japanese Imperial 
Army occupied much of China’s territory, and  Chinese ports were completely 
blockaded. Under these circumstances, the Haiphong-Yunnan railway became 
the only railway line connecting China to the outside world. In order to meet the 
demand the Chinese government placed on it, the railway’s transport capacity 
was increased from 6,000 to 18,000 tons at the beginning of 1939. This record 
increase in tonnage explains the railway’s 1939 operating revenue.
On the eve of the Sino-Japanese conflict, Chinese nationalists had to return 
to southern China. In November 1939, the Japanese army invaded Kuang-Si 
province and the Indochinese border zone, thus virtually asphyxiating Chinese 
nationalist troops. As a result, the Haiphong-Yunnan railway became a major 
military objective for the Japanese. In the eyes of French general staff, “The 
best way to preserve Indochina was using the Yunnan railway to supply the 
nationalist Chinese who could ‘fix’ the bulk of the Japanese forces.”6) The 
different policies on this course of action led to a very tense diplomatic situation 
between the French and the Japanese.
2. Discerning French Indochina’s attitude through archival documents
In June 1940, France fell to the Germans. The Japanese army immediately 
seized the opportunity to intensify “progressivement son influence7),” and 
on June 18th, 1940, Tokyo sent an ultimatum to the French in Indochina, calling 
for the closure of the Haiphong-Yunnan railway and the Sino-Tonkin border. 
Faced with an increase in pressure from Tokyo as well as Japanese bombings 
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starting at the end of 1939, Indochina general Gaullist Catroux, citing  “a simple 
army of law and order,”8) as protection, was obliged to give way, banning the 
transport of gasoline, armaments, and eventually all goods on June 17th, 20th, 
and 21st, 1940, respectively. In addition, in order to effect the definitive closure 
of traffic between Tonkin and Yunnan, and “calm the claims of Tokyo,”9) 
General Catroux deposited a rail at the Lao Kay border station on July 7th, 1940. 
However, it seems that his gesture “only manage[d] to push back the crisis.”10)
On July 20th, 1940, the Vichy regime replaced the governor general of 
Indochina with Admiral Découx who adopted “a firmer attitude than his 
predecessor against Japan.”11) Preserved in Aix-en province, France, the archival 
dossiers of the Cabinet militaire collection contain original and confidential 
télégrammes d’État, such as correspondence between Admiral Découx and 
French ambassadors in Washington and Tokyo. These documents reveal, as 
follows, Découx’s firm attitude towards some key issues:12)
- He persisted in thinking that “The agreement of landing of [sic] these 
troops would destroy the only chance we have left to save [the] colony” and 
insisted that “If we [the French government] must run the risk of losing 
Indochina, it is better to lose it by defending it than by betraying it.” Unlike 
Catroux, whose solution was to engage “in a process of irreversible 
abandonment, alienating Chungking,” 13) the solution that Découx chose aimed 
to fall under the terms of the ultimatum issued by Tokyo on June 18th, 1940.
- He demanded that the French government dispatch apparatus, crews, 
automatic weapons, and ammunition to Indochina through Russia and China as 
soon as possible.
- He emphasized the seriousness of the Vietnamese and Chinese reactions to 
the presence of Japanese troops in Indochina.
While Découx was attempting to placate Tokyo, Arsene Henry, the French 
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ambassador to Tokyo,  asserted that Japan intended to respect France’s rights 
and interests in the Far East, particularly with regard to the integrity of 
Indochina and France’s sovereign right over all parts of the Indochinese Union. 
On August 30th, 1940, after an August 2nd meeting in the same year between 
Henry and the new Japanese foreign minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, an agreement 
was finally signed whereby “France now authorizes [the] Japanese army to 
disembark at Haiphong, and use three Indochinese airfields,”14) as well as the 
two railroads from Haiphong to Lao Kay and from Haiphong to Lang Son to 
attack the Chinese resistance.
3. Evidence of Japanese political pressure in archival documents 
Given that it was supposed that France provided aid to the government of 
Chiang Kai Shek in the form of supplies of weapons and other products during 
the period spanning December 30th, 1939 to May 1943, the Japanese army 
decided to execute military operations and a bombing campaign on the Chinese 
section of the Yunnan railway. The railway suffered about twenty Japanese 
air strikes, which resulted in 143 casualties; 181 wounded; the destruction 
of many stations, tracks, bridges, cars, and wagons; damaged buildings and 
staff quarters; and cut telegraph and telephone wires. There was also a series 
of bombings on the 83-km bridge while a train was going towards Yunnan 
on February 1st, 1940. According to the Japanese government, this attack was 
of “absolute strategic necessity.”15) It caused serious damage not only to the 
railway company but also to civilians. There were 111 casualties, including five 
French, 24 Vietnamese, and 82 Chinese. In addition, 120 were wounded, and 
the tunnel upstream of the bridge was obstructed.
The Tonkinese section of the railway once again became a key subject of 
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Franco-Japanese interviews. On the side of the Japanese, the Vichy regime’s 
provocative choice (of which we spoke in Section 2) caused the great 
dissatisfaction of the Japanese government, resulting in unanimity among 
Japanese generals concerning the attack on Indochina. The Japanese suspected 
that a secret pact existed between Indochina and Chungking. They believed that 
Chiang Kai Shek’s troops would join French troops in the event of a Japanese 
attack on Indochina. Given these suspicions, Japan’s attitude towards Indochina 
depended on the result of talks concerning the following issues:16)
(a) the granting of a naval air base at Haiphong
(b) the use of the Yunnan railway
(c)  authorization for passage and stay at certain points for Japanese troops 
and equipment
(d)  the existence of the Chungking-Indochina pact 
If the Japanese proposals were rejected, the attack on Indochina would be 
immediately ordered under the pretext of the Indochina-Chungking pact since 
Chiang Kai Shek’s military allies would obviously be considered enemies of 
Japan.
With regard to the Haiphong-Lao Kay railway line, the Japanese army 
asked the railway company for a total of 6,359 railcars to transport their troops 
and war materials for the period September 30th, 1940 to December 13th, 1941. 
Based on the capacity of the railway cars and wagons at that time, the railway 
would have theoretically transported more than about 40,000 soldiers and 
77,500 tons of war material from Haiphong port to Hanoi, Phu Tho, and/or 
Lao Kay, and vice versa. The most requested routes were Haiphong to Hanoi 
and vice versa, and Haiphong to Gia Lam and vice versa. Hanoi station was a 
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stopover for Japanese troops going south of Tonkin while Gia Lam station was 
a stopover for northern destinations.
In conclusion, archival documents about the history of the Haiphong-
Yunnan railway not only contain materials that facilitate general study on the 
subject, they are also an research essential source for the economic, diplomatic, 
and social history of the Yunnan railroad. Furthermore, these archival 
documents clearly reflect the relationship between French Indochina and Japan, 
especially from 1939 to 1945. 
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